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REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT EXPERT ON THE PROTECTION  
OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS WHILE  
 COUNTERING TERRORISM, ROBERT K. GOLDMAN 
Summary 
 The Commission on Human Rights, in resolution 2004/87, decided to designate, 
from within existing resources, for a period of one year, an independent expert to assist the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights in the fulfilment of the mandate described in the 
resolution and, “taking fully into account the study requested in General Assembly 
resolution 58/187, as well as the discussions in the Assembly and the views of States thereon, to 
submit a report, through the High Commissioner, to the Commission at its sixty-first session on 
ways and means of strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism”. 
 This report is submitted in accordance with resolution 2004/87.  It builds and elaborates 
on the study of the High Commissioner (A/59/428) submitted to the fifty-ninth session of the 
General Assembly pursuant to Assembly resolution 58/187.  The report identifies some key 
issues affecting the enjoyment of human rights in the struggle against terrorism that either 
have not been addressed or extensively developed by other mandate holders.  The report then 
goes on to address how to strengthen the United Nations human rights mechanisms in protecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.  It acknowledges that 
significant steps have already been taken by the United Nations human rights system to address 
the protection and promotion of human rights in the struggle against terrorism.  Nevertheless, the 
independent expert concludes that, given the gaps in coverage of the monitoring systems of the 
special procedures and treaty bodies and the pressing need to strengthen human rights 
protections while countering terrorism, the Commission should consider the creation of a special 
procedure with a multidimensional mandate to monitor States’ counter-terrorism measures and 
their compatibility with international human rights law. 
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Introduction1 
1. This report is submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 2004/87.  It builds and elaborates on the study that the High Commissioner submitted 
to the General Assembly on 8 October 2004 (A/59/428) pursuant to Assembly resolution 58/187.  
The present report identifies some key issues affecting the enjoyment of human rights in the 
struggle against terrorism that either have not been addressed or extensively developed by other 
mandate holders.  Because of word limitations, it was not possible to undertake an in-depth 
examination of many of these issues, much less examine the compatibility of national 
counter-terrorism measures with many other internationally protected human rights,  
including economic, social and cultural rights.  The report next addresses how to strengthen 
United Nations human rights mechanisms in protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism. 
I.  METHODOLOGY 
2. The independent expert considered that a rights-based methodology provided the most 
effective structure for his analysis.  Under this approach, States’ counter-terrorism measures are 
examined within the framework of international human rights law.  Accordingly, particular 
emphasis has been placed on decisions, general comments and concluding observations of the 
Human Rights Committee and the work product of other United Nations treaty bodies and 
special procedures.  In addition, the jurisprudence and/or reports of various regional 
human rights bodies have been referred to.  Also included is an analysis of how conventional and 
customary rules of international humanitarian law, i.e. the law of armed conflict, may affect or 
interact with States’ human rights obligations when the struggle against terrorism involves armed 
conflict.  Fundamental principles of refugee law have also been taken into consideration. 
II.  VIEWS OF STATES 
3. The independent expert has been attentive to the provision in his mandate calling on 
him to take into account the views of States.  In this connection, he has carefully considered 
the views which were included in the study the High Commissioner submitted to the 
General Assembly, as well as other views reflected in the report of the Secretary-General to the 
sixtieth session of the Commission on Human Rights (E/CN.4/2004/91).  In addition, on 30 
and 31 August 2004, the independent expert was in Geneva and met with the coordinators of all 
regional groups represented on the Commission on Human Rights to discuss his mandate.  He 
held further meetings with the representatives of several States while in New York to appear 
before the Third Committee of the General Assembly on 27 October 2004.  Finally, the 
independent expert was briefed by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 





III.  ISSUES AFFECTING THE ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS  
WHILE COUNTERING TERRORISM 
4. At the outset, the independent expert wishes to express his condemnation of all acts of 
terrorism and his conviction that terrorism seriously threatens the exercise of human rights, the 
functioning of democratic institutions and the maintenance of international peace and security.  
He also expresses his solidarity with victims of terrorism and their families. 
5. The emergence of global terrorist networks intent on inflicting unprecedented loss of life, 
as evidenced by the horrific attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States and attacks 
elsewhere, unquestionably requires enhanced international and regional cooperation to prevent, 
punish and suppress terrorist violence.  Success in the struggle against terrorism, however, will 
require the international community not just to respond to its violent consequences, but to uphold 
the rule of law in combating it. 
6. In the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the Security Council 
on 28 September 2001 adopted resolution 1373 (2001), which obligated States, inter alia, 
to implement more effective domestic counter-terrorism measures and created the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor those measures.  That resolution, regrettably, 
contained no comprehensive reference2 to the duty of States to respect human rights in the design 
and implementation of such counter-terrorism measures.  This omission may have given 
currency to the notion that the price of winning the global struggle against terrorism might 
require sacrificing fundamental rights and freedoms.  Any such notion was, however, rejected 
by the Security Council in a declaration annexed to resolution 1456 (2003), adopted 
on 20 January 2003, which declared that “States must ensure that any measure taken to combat 
terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular international 
human rights, refugee and humanitarian law.”  The Secretary-General, echoing this view at a 
special meeting of the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee on 6 March 2003, stated 
that “Our responses to terrorism, as well as our efforts to thwart it and prevent it, should uphold 
the human rights that the terrorists aim to destroy.  Respect for human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law are essential tools in the effort to combat terrorism - not privileges 
to be sacrificed at a time of tension”. 
A. Upholding the rule of law while confronting terrorism:   
human rights protection during emergency situations 
7. Properly viewed, the struggle against terrorism and the protection of human rights 
are not antithetical, but complementary responsibilities of States.  As the Berlin Declaration, 
adopted on 28 August 2004 at the Biennial Conference of the International Commission of 
Jurists, states, “safeguarding persons from terrorist acts and respecting human rights both 
form part of a seamless web of protection incumbent upon the State”.3  Several regional 
organizations and intergovernmental bodies, such as the Organization of American States4 and 
the Council of Europe,5 have adopted treaties or guidelines that affirm the importance of 
protecting human rights in the struggle against terrorism.  However, since the adoption of 
resolution 1373 (2001), other regional bodies and numerous States have sanctioned 
counter-terrorism measures which are inconsistent with internationally recognized human rights 
standards.  This situation caused United Nations special rapporteurs and independent experts to 
adopt a joint statement (E/CN.4/2004/4, annex I) at their annual meeting in Geneva in June 2003 
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in which they expressed profound concern at the multiplication of policies, laws and practices 
increasingly being adopted by many countries in the struggle against terrorism which in their 
view were negatively affecting the enjoyment of virtually all human rights. 
8. It is worth recalling that, when drafting the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and various regional human rights instruments, States were keenly aware of the 
need to strike a realistic balance between the requirements of national security and the protection 
of human rights.  Accordingly, States included in these instruments provisions that permit them 
when confronting an emergency or crisis situation, which may include actual or imminent 
terrorist violence or threats, to limit, restrict or, in highly exceptional circumstances set out in 
article 4 of ICCPR, derogate from certain rights in these instruments.  Restrictions and 
limitations on rights, which are permitted even in normal times, must be provided for in the 
provisions of the treaties protecting these rights.6 
9. The ability of States to derogate from rights under these instruments is governed by 
several conditions which are in turn regulated by the generally recognized principles of 
proportionality, necessity and non-discrimination.7  Article 4 of ICCPR sets forth the following 
procedural and substantive safeguards regarding the declaration and implementation of a state of 
emergency:  the nature of the emergency must threaten the life of the nation; the existence of the 
emergency must be officially proclaimed; the measures adopted are strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation; derogations cannot be incompatible with the derogating State’s other 
obligations under international law; the derogation measures must not be discriminatory; and the 
derogating State must notify other States parties, through the United Nations Secretary-General, 
of the provisions it has derogated from and the reasons for such derogation, as well as of the date 
the derogation has ceased to apply. 
10. While conceding States ample discretion in adopting anti-terrorism measures, ICCPR and 
most other human rights instruments also specify certain rights that may not be derogated from 
even during emergency situations.  The list of non-derogable rights in ICCPR are contained in 
article 4 (2).  These are, namely, right to life (art. 6); prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment (art. 7); prohibition of slavery, the slave trade and servitude 
(art. 8, paras. 1 and 2); prohibition of imprisonment because of inability to fulfil a contractual 
debt (art. 11); prohibition of retroactive criminal laws (art. 15); the recognition of everyone as a 
person before the law (art. 16); and freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 18). 
11. On 24 July 2001, the Human Rights Committee adopted general comment No. 29 on 
article 4 (states of emergency), which further clarified when rights can be derogated from in 
emergency situations.  The Committee also identified the following examples of provisions in 
ICCPR as not being lawfully derogable during emergencies:  all persons deprived of liberty must 
be treated humanely; the prohibition of hostage-taking, abductions or unacknowledged 
detentions; the protection of persons belonging to minorities; the prohibition of unlawful 
deportation or transfer of populations; and the declaration of an emergency as a justification to 
engage in propaganda for war, or in advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that would 
constitute incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. 
12. The jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee and regional supervisory bodies 
indicates that derogations are always exceptional and temporary measures.  Accordingly, such 




exists or can be managed by less intrusive means under the relevant instrument.8  This 
jurisprudence also suggests that as the underlying purpose of such measures is to permit States 
to protect democratic institutions, the rule of law and the enjoyment of basic freedoms, such 
measures cannot lawfully be undertaken to weaken or destroy them.9  As a corollary, questions 
concerning the compatibility of limitations on and derogations from rights under the Covenant 
and regional treaties are not self-judging by national authorities, but are subject to review and 
supervision by the competent treaty monitoring body.  It also should be recalled that in order to 
afford individuals the most favourable standard of human rights protection, article 5 (2) of 
ICCPR mandates that restrictions and derogations under the Covenant cannot be used to justify 
restrictions on or derogations from human rights that are impermissible under other applicable 
international instruments or laws. 
B. The role of the civilian judiciary in supervising  
national counter-terrorism measures 
13. International concern about the use of emergency measures by States to quell terrorist 
violence and internal strife is hardly a new phenomenon.  Beginning in the mid-1970s, the 
Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,10 the 
International Law Association,11 legal experts,12 and some non-governmental organizations13 
undertook or sponsored studies which, inter alia, identified the effects of emergencies on the 
allocation of powers within many States and emblematic human rights abuses most associated 
with those States’ counter-terrorism and other emergency measures.  Many of these studies 
found that human rights were often at heightened risk of abuse, even in democracies, where 
emergency powers were increasingly concentrated in the executive branch.  In order to prevent 
such abuses, these reports stressed the need for States to guarantee the independence and 
supervisory powers of the civilian judiciary during all emergency situations. 
14. This admonition is no less relevant in today’s struggle against terrorism than it 
was some 20 years ago.  In a speech by the High Commissioner for Human Rights delivered 
on 27 August 2004 to the Biennial Conference of the International Commission of Jurists, 
Ms. Arbour underscored the importance of judicial review, stating, “Put bluntly, the judiciary 
should not surrender its sober, long-term, principled analysis of issues to a call by the executive 
for extraordinary measures grounded in information that cannot be shared, to achieve results that 
cannot be measured”.  She added:  “Societies that respect the rule of law do not provide the 
executive a blanket authority even in dealing with exceptional situations.  They embrace the vital 
roles of the judiciary and the legislature in ensuring that Governments take a balanced and lawful 
approach to complex issues of national interest.  A well-honed system of checks and balances 
provides the orderly expression of conflicting views within a country and increases confidence 
that the government is responsive to the interest of the public rather than to the whim of the 
executive.” 
15. A recurring theme in this report is that civilian courts must have jurisdiction to review the 
provisions and supervise the application of all counter-terrorist measures without any pressure or 
interference, particularly from the other branches of Government.  
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C. The applicability and relevance of international humanitarian 
law when confronting terrorism involves armed conflict 
16. A key issue affecting the protection of human rights in the struggle against terrorism 
concerns the divergent views of States about the nature of the struggle and, particularly, the 
measures they have employed in responding to it.  Since 11 September 2001, some States, 
without disregarding the need for international cooperation, see this struggle as a new kind of 
war against a global terrorist network which essentially requires a military response.  Other 
States, without discounting the use of military force in certain circumstances, view this struggle 
as not an entirely new phenomenon which requires enhanced international cooperation in law 
enforcement, intelligence gathering and sharing, extradition, and the like.  
17. However States conceive of the struggle against terrorism, it is both legally and 
conceptually important that acts of terrorism not be invariably conflated with acts of war.  For 
example, attacks against civilians, the taking of hostages and the seizure and destruction of 
civilian aircraft are accepted by the international community to be forms of terrorism.  But these 
acts can take place during peacetime, emergency situations or situations of armed conflict.  If 
committed during an armed conflict, such acts may constitute war crimes.  However, when such 
acts take place during peacetime or an emergency not involving hostilities, as is frequently the 
case, they simply do not constitute war crimes, and their perpetrators should not be labelled, tried 
or targeted as combatants.  Such situations are governed not by international humanitarian law, 
but by international human rights law, domestic law and, perhaps, international criminal law. 
18. This does not mean, however, that the nature and intensity of violence generated by or 
against the perpetrators of terrorist acts cannot trigger or amount to a situation of armed conflict.  
For example, terrorist or counter-terrorist actions may entail resort to armed force between States 
giving rise to an international armed conflict, as was the case in Afghanistan in 2002, or a 
non-international armed conflict involving armed confrontations between a State’s armed forces 
and a relatively organized dissident armed group or between such groups within the territory of a 
State.14  In such cases, pertinent rules of international humanitarian law become applicable to 
and govern the conduct of the hostilities.  A fundamental tenet of humanitarian law is that it 
equally binds all the parties to an armed conflict, and its application is not contingent on the 
causes or origins of the hostilities.15  Thus, antipathy for the adversary or his avowed policies 
cannot justify non-compliance with the laws of war.  Although humanitarian law proscribes 
terrorism,16 the fact that such acts are committed during an armed conflict does not alter either 
the legal status of the hostilities or of the parties involved or the duty of the parties to observe 
humanitarian law.  
19. During an international armed conflict, it is crucial that States properly determine under 
applicable humanitarian law treaties the status of all persons who have directly participated in 
the hostilities and particularly whether they are entitled on capture to prisoner of war (POW) 
status.  Because denial of POW status to combatants potentially entails life or death 
consequences for the persons concerned, such status determinations should be made in strict 
conformity with applicable laws and procedures.  In this regard, article 517 of the Geneva 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention) creates a 
presumption that a person who commits a hostile act is a POW unless a competent tribunal 




20. The failure of one of the parties involved in the 2002 hostilities in Afghanistan to make 
such individualized status determinations in the case of persons who allegedly perpetrated or 
otherwise participated in terrorist violence before or during that conflict has generated 
considerable controversy.  That party’s position was that such persons, whether or not members 
of the adversary’s regular armed forces or irregular groups, were by virtue of their alleged 
terrorist acts or links ipso facto unprivileged combatants18 who were neither entitled to POW 
status under the Third Geneva Convention, nor protection as civilians under the Geneva 
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva 
Convention).19  Other States and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), citing 
prior State practice, military manuals and the views of many legal commentators, disputed that 
position.20  They maintained that, apart from mandating for such persons individualized status 
determinations by article 5 tribunals, the comprehensive system of protection contained in the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 requires that unprivileged combatants who are 
disqualified from POW status under the Third Geneva Convention be afforded protection under 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, provided they meet the nationality criteria stipulated in article 4 
of that treaty.21  The proponents of this position correctly note that the perpetrators of such 
terrorist acts, even if protected as POWs or civilians under the Geneva Conventions or, where 
applicable, Additional Protocol I, do not enjoy any immunity from prosecution for their 
pre-capture offences, including terrorist acts, whether committed prior to or during the hostilities.  
As stated by the ICRC President, “The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are 
not an obstacle to justice.  They merely require that due process of law be applied in dealing with 
alleged offenders.”22  
21. Despite these divergent views, there is broad agreement that persons who are classified 
as unprivileged combatants in international hostilities and, for whatever reason, are denied 
de jure protection under either the Third or Fourth Geneva Conventions are entitled to the 
customary law guarantees set forth in article 75 of Additional Protocol I23 and article 324 
common to the four Geneva Conventions.  It should be noted that because humanitarian law 
does not confer privileged combatant status on members of dissident armed groups in 
non-international armed conflicts, such persons are not entitled on capture to POW status.  
Accordingly, States are free to try them for all their hostile, including terrorist, acts.25  There is 
thus no circumstance in which any person, however classified, can legally be placed beyond the 
protection of international humanitarian law in any armed conflict.  
22. While not discounting that State practice might well evolve in its responses to new forms 
of terrorist violence, it would appear that existing humanitarian law contains no glaring legal 
voids and, if observed and properly applied, adequately takes account of issues of terrorism 
during armed conflicts.26   
D. The relationship between international human rights and 
international humanitarian law during armed conflicts 
23. Human rights law does not cease to apply when the struggle against terrorism involves 
armed conflict.  Rather, it applies cumulatively with international humanitarian law.  As 
previously noted, when an armed conflict constitutes a genuine emergency, a State may restrict 
and even derogate from certain human rights.  But it can never suspend rights that are 
non-derogable under human rights law even when the emergency is due to armed conflict.  
Despite their different origins, international human rights and humanitarian law share a common 
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purpose of upholding human life and dignity.  As the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) has stated:  “The general principle of respect for human dignity is ... the very 
raison d’être of international humanitarian law and human rights law; indeed in modern times it 
has become of such paramount importance as to permeate the whole body of international 
law.”27   
24. It is not surprising that international human rights and humanitarian law are increasingly 
being viewed as constituting a complementary and mutually reinforcing regime of protections 
that should be interpreted and applied as a whole so as to accord individuals during armed 
conflicts the most favourable standards of protection. 
25. The Human Rights Committee, the European Court and former Commission of Human 
Rights, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have found their respective 
instruments to apply extraterritorially, even in situations covered by international humanitarian 
law.  For example, the Human Rights Committee in 1981 found that a State party to ICCPR was 
responsible for violating rights under the Covenant which its agents had committed within the 
territory of another State.28  In its recent general comment No. 31 (80) on article 2 of the 
Covenant, the Committee indicated that the obligation to respect and ensure rights of individuals 
“also applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State party acting 
outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was 
obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State party assigned to an 
international peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation” (para. 10).  In recent concluding 
observations, the Committee specifically affirmed that the Covenant applies extraterritorially to 
military and peacekeeping operations outside of the territory of the States concerned.29  
Inter-American and European human rights bodies have similarly found in certain circumstances 
that persons falling within a State’s authority and control outside of national territory are 
effectively within that State’s jurisdiction and holders of enforceable rights under their respective 
treaties.30  
26. Several States have disputed the competence of human rights bodies to apply human 
rights law extraterritorially or during armed conflicts and occupations.  The International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) shed light on some of these claims in two advisory opinions that addressed issues 
concerning the relationship between human rights and international humanitarian law and the 
extraterritorial application of the Covenant and other human rights treaties.  In its Advisory 
Opinion of 8 July 1996 on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,31 the Court 
made clear that the ICCPR applied during armed conflict.  It stated regarding the right to life 
guaranteed in that instrument:  “In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life 
applies also in hostilities.  The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls 
to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict 
which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.”32   
27. The Court in its Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004 on the Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories33 confirmed this view stating that 
it:  “... considers that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case 
of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in 
article 4 of the [ICCPR] …”.34  Concerning the relationship between human rights and 
humanitarian law, it added:  “… there are thus three possible situations:  some rights may be 




human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law”.35  The 
Court’s opinions clearly indicate that in situations of armed conflict the lex specialis character of 
international humanitarian law does not, as such, derogate from human rights law.  Rather, 
humanitarian law must be consulted to determine whether a Covenant-based right has been 
violated.36  
28. The Court, also in its 9 July 2004 Advisory Opinion, after examining the travaux 
préparatoires of the ICCPR and the decisions and observations of the Human Rights Committee, 
rejected the argument that the Covenant was not applicable outside a State’s territorial borders 
and, more particularly, in occupied territory.  While recognizing that the jurisdiction of States is 
primarily territorial, the Court concluded that the Covenant’s reach extended to “acts done by a 
State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside of its own territory”.37   
29. Human rights treaty bodies have no common approach on how human rights law relates 
to rules of international humanitarian law during armed conflicts.  Indeed, neither the European 
Court nor the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has expressed to date an 
opinion on this subject.  The Human Rights Committee has not yet articulated a comprehensive 
theory concerning this relationship.  However, in general comment No. 31 (80) the Committee 
stated:  “As implied in general comment No. 29, the Covenant applies also in situations of armed 
conflict to which the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable.  While, in respect of 
certain Covenant rights, more specific rules of international humanitarian law may be specially 
relevant for the purposes of the interpretation of Covenant rights, both spheres of law are 
complementary, not mutually exclusive” (para. 11). 
30. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has recognized that the test for 
evaluating the observance of a particular human right in a situation of armed conflict may be 
distinct from that applicable in peacetime.  Accordingly, the Commission has looked to rules and 
standards of international humanitarian law as sources of authoritative guidance or as the 
lex specialis in interpreting and applying the American Convention or American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man to resolve claimed violations of these instruments in combat 
situations.38  
31. The approaches taken by the Inter-American Commission and the Human Rights 
Committee are thus consistent with the view of ICJ concerning the relationship between 
international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed conflict.  
E. The principle of nullum crimen sine lege and definitions 
of terrorism and terrorist-related offences 
32. One clear threat to the enjoyment of human rights stems from conflicting and imprecise 
definitions of terrorism and/or terrorist offences contained in numerous national laws and 
regional and subregional instruments.  Despite the absence of a universally agreed-to definition 
of terrorism, some 120 States have ratified the 1999 International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which identifies the elements of the crime of 
terrorism with reasonable precision.  For purposes of that treaty, terrorism includes any “act 
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an 
active part in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its 
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international 
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organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”.  Many States, however, have enacted laws 
that are considerably broader than this definition, frequently using sweeping, vague and/or 
ambiguous terms and concepts.  Other States have prudently adapted their criminal law by, for 
example, increasing the penalties for existing and well-defined crimes, such as murder, when 
committed with a terrorist intent.  
33. Whatever their approach, States should be guided by the principle of legality or nullum 
crimen sine lege when drafting anti-terrorist laws and treaties.  This principle of general 
international law is enshrined and made expressly non-derogable in article 15 of the Covenant 
and the provisions of regional human rights treaties.39  It prohibits not only the application of 
ex post facto laws, but also requires that the criminalized conduct be described in precise and 
unambiguous language that narrowly defines the punishable offence and distinguishes it from 
conduct that is either not punishable or is punishable by other penalties.  Defining crimes without 
precision can also lead to a broadening of the proscribed conduct by judicial interpretation.  
Accordingly, the principle of legality also entails the principle of certainty, i.e. that the law is 
reasonably foreseeable in its application and consequences.  The Human Rights Committee 
underscored in paragraph 7 of general comment No. 29 the importance of the principle of 
legality in the Covenant’s prohibition against retroactive criminal law. 
34. The Committee has carefully scrutinized States parties’ anti-terrorism measures in its 
reporting procedure and has available for consultation the reports States have submitted under 
Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) to the Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee.  It is 
troubling that, of the 33 State reports it has reviewed since 11 September 2001, the Committee 
has expressed concern about counter-terrorism measures in its concluding observations on no 
less than 16 reports.  These concerns include definitions of terrorism and terrorist-related 
offences.40  Moreover, other United Nations treaty bodies, mandate holders, legal experts and 
non-governmental organizations have expressed similar concerns about various States’ 
anti-terrorism measures, as well as regional and subregional anti-terrorism instruments, put in 
place before and after September 2001. 
35. Laws that define terrorism or terrorist offences without precision not only clearly risk 
criminalizing the lawful exercise of freedom of speech, assembly, association and other basic 
human rights, but are also subject to abusive application.  Additionally, the proliferation of 
national laws and treaties, particularly regional ones, with widely divergent legal definitions of 
terrorism and/or terrorist offences does little to foster international cooperation in the struggle 
against terrorism and potentially undermines extradition of genuine terrorist suspects because of 
the requirement of double criminality, which is closely linked to the principle of nullum crimen 
sine lege. 
F.  Right to liberty and security of persons 
36. Another relevant issue concerns the extent to which the right to liberty and security41 of 
terrorist suspects may be properly suspended during emergency situations outside of armed 
conflict. Particularly problematic developments since 11 September 2001 have included the 
indefinite, prolonged or incommunicado detention of terrorist suspects without access to courts, 
the unacknowledged or secret detention of suspected terrorists, and the detention of children in 




37. It is widely known, for example, that since the 11 September attacks terrorist suspects 
have been detained for prolonged periods without contact with lawyers or other persons and 
without access to courts or other appropriate tribunals to supervise the legality and conditions of 
their detentions.  It has also been reported that in these unscrutinized conditions some detainees 
have been subjected to torture and other ill-treatment.  These practices are prohibited under 
international human rights law even during states of emergency.  Applicable human rights 
protections require, inter alia, that any deprivation of liberty be based upon grounds and 
procedures established by law, that detainees be informed of the reasons for the detention and 
promptly notified of the charges against them,42 and that they be provided with access to legal 
counsel.43  In addition, prompt and effective oversight of detention by a judge or other officer 
authorized by law to exercise judicial power must be ensured to verify the legality of the 
detention and to protect other fundamental rights of the detainee.44  The Human Rights 
Committee has stated that in order to protect non-derogable rights, the right to take proceedings 
before a court to enable it to decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention must not be 
diminished by a State’s decision to derogate from the Covenant.45  The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights has similarly concluded that the right to habeas corpus cannot be derogated from 
in states of emergency owing to its vital role in protecting the detainee’s non-derogable rights.46  
For like reasons, other protections fundamental to upholding the non-derogable rights of 
detainees cannot be justifiably suspended during a state of emergency, including access to legal 
counsel and prescribed and reasonable limits upon the length of preventative detention.47  At all 
times, therefore, States must refrain from detaining suspected terrorists for indefinite or 
prolonged periods and must provide them with access to legal counsel, as well as prompt and 
effective access to courts or other appropriate tribunals for the protection of their non-derogable 
rights. 
38. When detentions occur during armed conflicts, the principles noted previously 
concerning the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law 
suggest that humanitarian law may serve as the applicable lex specialis in determining whether 
detentions connected with an armed conflict or occupation are arbitrary under human rights law.  
In the case of international armed conflicts, for example, both the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 contain provisions addressing the circumstances under which POWs and 
civilians, respectively, may be interned or detained and the manner in which their internment or 
detention must be monitored, including access by the ICRC.48  Articles 21, 118 and 119 of the 
Third Geneva Convention permit the internment of POWs until their repatriation at the 
“cessation of active hostilities” or the completion of any criminal proceedings or punishment for 
an indictable offence that may be pending against a POW.49 
39. In contrast, articles 42, 43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, applicable to enemy 
aliens within the territory of a party to an international armed conflict or protected persons in 
occupied territories, permit the internment or placing in assigned residence of such protected 
persons only if the security of the Detaining or Occupying Power makes it absolutely necessary.  
These provisions also mandate that any such person shall have the right to have such action 
reconsidered or appealed with the least possible delay and, if it is continued, subject to periodic 
review by an appropriate or competent body, court or administrative tribunal designated for that 
purpose.  The ICTY has concluded that “an initially lawful internment clearly becomes unlawful 
if the detaining power does not respect the basic procedural rights of the detained persons and 
does not establish an appropriate court or administrative board as prescribed in article 43 [of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention]”.50  The Tribunal’s reasoning arguably would also apply to civilians 
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detained or interned in occupied territory under article 78 of the Fourth Convention.  Under 
certain limited circumstances, protected persons detained in occupied territory may forfeit their 
rights of communication in accordance with article 5, second paragraph, of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.51  However, this forfeiture has been significantly curtailed by article 45 (3) of 
Additional Protocol I52 and may likewise be mitigated by protections under human rights law 
prohibiting prolonged incommunicado detention in all circumstances.  
40. Further, persons detained by a party to an international armed conflict and who do not 
benefit from more favorable treatment under the Conventions or under Additional Protocol I, 
including, unprivileged combatants, are beneficiaries of certain rules governing their detention 
under article 75 (3), (5) and (6) of Additional Protocol I, which essentially reflects customary 
international law.53 
41. Thus, during international armed conflicts and occupations, certain categories of persons, 
such as POWs, may be detained without the procedural protections otherwise afforded to 
individuals detained in peacetime.  However, given the concurrent application of international 
human rights and humanitarian law during armed conflicts, human rights bodies and/or domestic 
courts might have to protect the basic rights of wartime detainees where mechanisms under 
humanitarian law for determining their legal status or supervising their treatment are not 
observed or prove ineffective.54 
42. Some terrorist suspects reportedly have been subjected to unacknowledged or secret 
detention since 11 September 2001.  In addition, detained persons apparently qualifying for 
protection under the Fourth Geneva Convention have been hidden from the ICRC, or transferred 
from and held outside of occupied territory for interrogation.  Such acts are prohibited under 
international human rights law and humanitarian law.  The Human Rights Committee has 
specifically recognized as non-derogable in all circumstances the prohibitions against the taking 
of hostages, abductions and unacknowledged detention, given the status of these proscriptions as 
norms of general international law.55  Unacknowledged or secret detentions also foster an 
environment in which disappearances, torture and other serious human rights violations may 
occur.  Moreover, during international armed conflicts or occupation, the concealing of detainees 
from the ICRC contravenes both the letter and spirit of applicable humanitarian law, particularly 
in view of the critical role played by the ICRC in ensuring protection and assistance to the 
victims of armed conflict.56  Further, transfers or deportations of protected persons from 
occupied territories are specifically prohibited57 by and constitute grave breaches of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention.58  States must therefore refrain from any practice of unacknowledged or 
secret detentions at all times and under all circumstances. 
G.  Rights of detained children 
43. Also of concern since the 11 September attacks has been the detention of children who 
are suspected of terrorist activities.  In some instances, persons under 18 years of age reportedly 
have been held in the same facilities as adults and have been the victims of mistreatment, 
including intimidation by police dogs and sexual abuse.  It has also been reported that detained 
children have been denied contact with legal counsel, family and consular officials, as well as the 
right to challenge the lawfulness of their detention before a court.  International human rights law 
forbids measures of this nature at all times, including during states of emergency.  In this respect, 




human rights treaties that are inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.59  
These obligations include, for example, the protections under the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and other instruments relating to juvenile justice60 as well as similar provisions of 
humanitarian law treaties that specifically address the situation of children.61  For example, 
article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child indicates that children should be detained 
only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.  When in 
detention, a child must be treated humanely and in a manner which takes into account the needs 
of persons of his/ her age.  Children must also be afforded the right to maintain contact with their 
families, save in exceptional circumstances, and the right to prompt access to legal and other 
appropriate assistance.  As the Human Rights Committee has noted, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child does not include a derogation clause and applies in emergency situations.62  
At all times, therefore, the detention of children must be exceptional and undertaken through 
measures that acknowledge and protect their particular vulnerabilities.  
H.  Rights to due process and to a fair trial 
44. Guaranteeing the right of terrorist suspects to a fair trial is critical for ensuring that 
anti-terrorism measures respect the rule of law.  The human rights protections for all persons 
charged with criminal offences, including terrorism-related crimes, are provided for in articles 14 
and 15 of ICCPR, as well as corresponding provisions of regional human rights instruments.63  
These protections include the right to be presumed innocent, the right to a hearing with due 
guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, and 
a right to have a conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal satisfying the same 
standards.64  International humanitarian law provides for largely identical protections for the trial 
of persons in the context of armed conflicts.65  Indeed, many of the fair trial guarantees in 
humanitarian law treaties were largely drawn from standards in human rights law.66  
45. The Human Rights Committee has expounded its views in general comment No. 29 on 
the nature and importance of judicial guarantees and the right to a fair trial in relation to the 
Covenant’s non-derogable rights.  It has noted that safeguards related to derogation in article 4 
“are based on the principles of legality and the rule of law inherent in the Covenant as a whole” 
(para. 16).  The Committee has also opined that article 4 could never be used “in a way that 
would result in derogation from non-derogable rights” (para. 15)67 such that, for example, any 
trial entailing the death penalty during an emergency must meet all the Covenant’s provisions, 
including fair trial guarantees under articles 14 and 15.  The Committee has also stated that since 
elements of a fair trial are guaranteed by international humanitarian law during armed conflicts, 
the fundamental requirement of a fair trial cannot be derogated from in other emergency 
situations.  Further, it has indicated that only a court of law, observing the presumption of 
innocence, may try and convict a person for a crime (para. 16).  
I.  Military tribunals 
46. Prior to and since 11 September 2001, several key concerns have characterized the 
application of due process guarantees in the prosecution of individuals for terrorism-related 
crimes.  Among the most pressing issues has been the practice of establishing special courts or 
tribunals, including military tribunals, to try civilians suspected of terrorist crimes where those 
tribunals fail to meet minimum fair trial standards under international law.  While military courts 
can in principle constitute an independent and impartial tribunal for the purposes of trying 
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members of the military for certain crimes truly related to military service and discipline, 
problems arise when military courts are used to try civilians for terrorism-related offences.  In 
general comment No. 13, the Human Rights Committee has indicated that the use of military 
courts to try civilians should be very exceptional and take place under conditions which 
genuinely afford the full guarantees stipulated in article 14 (para. 4).  Inter-American treaty 
bodies, based upon more than 40 years of experience,68 have been more categorical by uniformly 
finding the trial of civilians, including members of dissident armed groups, by military courts to 
contravene fundamental due process rights.  
47. Past experience amply suggests that military tribunals rarely satisfy the minimum 
requirements of independence and impartiality applicable to the trial of civilians as required by 
human rights law because the military justice system is generally not part of the independent 
civilian judiciary, but rather is part of the executive branch.69  The use of special courts or 
tribunals is also problematic because they often do not use the duly established procedures of the 
legal process.  Emblematic practices of these tribunals have included violations of the principle 
of non-retroactivity of penal law, restrictions on access to witnesses and evidence, and the 
employment of national security considerations that are not part of ordinary trials before civilian 
courts, as well as the gathering of evidence for use before such tribunals by means that violate 
human rights standards.  Concerning the latter practice, international law clearly prohibits the use 
of coerced or involuntary confessions,70 as well as the use as evidence of any statement made as 
a result of torture.71  Where international standards are less defined, for example, restrictions 
upon the use of evidence gathered through an unlawful search, the paramount consideration must 
remain the effect of the use of that evidence on the fairness of the proceedings as a whole.72  
When secret information is relied upon, safeguards must be in place to ensure the principle of 
equality of arms, including effective access to the information by the judge and defendant’s 
counsel. 
48. Since 11 September 2001, some persons classified as “enemy” or unprivileged 
combatants have been bound over for trial before military commissions that have been criticized 
as failing to satisfy minimum fair trial standards under international law.  It is important to 
emphasize that fundamental due process protections under international humanitarian law apply 
not only to POWs and civilians, but also to unprivileged combatants who, for whatever reason, 
are denied protection under the Third or Fourth Geneva Convention.  In trials related to 
international hostilities, these protections stem from the customary law principles embodied in 
common article 3 and article 75 (4) of Additional Protocol I.  Trials related to non-international 
conflicts must also conform to the standards in common article 3, as supplemented by the 
customary international law principles enshrined in article 6 of Additional Protocol II.  These 
provisions’ guarantees are non-derogable and therefore constitute minimum standards that may 
never be suspended.73  Further, the non-derogable status of these protections under humanitarian 
law blocks any derogations that might otherwise be authorized under applicable human rights 
instruments insofar as they relate to charges arising out of the hostilities.74  Accordingly, during 
armed conflicts, States may not invoke derogations under the ICCPR or other human rights 
instruments to justify not affording any person, however classified, minimum due process and 
fair trial protections.  This precept is particularly important in capital cases.  Specifically, the 
Human Rights Committee has stipulated that article 4 of ICCPR can never be used “in a way that 
would result in derogation from non-derogable rights”,75 and hence any trial entailing the death 
penalty during an emergency must meet all the Covenant’s provisions, including articles 14 




J.  Right to humane treatment 
49. Since 11 September 2001, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other mandate holders 
have expressed concern about methods employed by some States to confront terrorism that 
reportedly seek to circumvent and thereby undermine the prohibition of torture and cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment in the ICCPR, the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (Torture Convention) and other human rights 
instruments.  These concerns include interrogation techniques used to elicit information from 
terrorist suspects, the use in legal proceedings of evidence obtained by torture, the existence of 
secret places of detention, and draft legislation that would encourage immigration authorities to 
return certain persons found to be in danger of torture to the very country that is likely to torture 
them.  Each of these measures is incompatible with the absolute prohibition of torture and other 
forms of ill-treatment in human rights law. 
50. It should be recalled that proscriptions of torture and ill-treatment are also codified in the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977.  The Geneva 
Conventions mandate that protected persons must at all times be treated humanely and make the 
wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment of these persons grave breaches, which are serious 
war crimes.  Additionally, unprivileged combatants in international hostilities who, for whatever 
reason, are denied protection under the Geneva Conventions are similarly entitled as a matter of 
customary law to protection against torture and other ill-treatment under common article 3 and 
article 75 of Additional Protocol I.  The prohibition of ill-treatment in common article 3 also 
applies in all non-international armed conflicts to all persons who do not or no longer actively 
participate in the hostilities when they are in the hands of a party to the conflict. 
51. As previously noted, ICCPR applies to extraterritorial acts of States parties within 
occupied territory.  Moreover, international humanitarian law applies throughout the territory of 
the occupied State and is binding on the nationals, both military and civilian, of the Occupying 
Power(s).  It is thus alarming that, according to published reports and photographs, various 
detainees protected under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions were subjected by nationals 
of Occupying Powers to treatment amounting to torture under the jurisprudence of human rights 
bodies.  Although some persons directly involved in the illicit treatment of these detainees have 
been prosecuted as required by the Geneva Conventions, their actions have undercut years of 
efforts to establish effective international safeguards on the treatment of wartime detainees. 
K.  The principle of non-refoulement and the inter-State transfer of persons 
52. Since 11 September 2001, some States have reportedly extradited, expelled, deported, or 
otherwise transferred foreigners, some of them asylum-seekers, suspected of terrorism to their 
country of origin or to other countries where they allegedly face a risk of torture or ill-treatment, 
in disregard of the principle of non-refoulement.  This principle, which is embodied in 
article 33 (1) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,76 is absolute and 
non-derogable under human rights law, in particular, article 3 of the Torture Convention. 
53. The Human Rights Committee in its general comment No. 31 emphasized that the 
obligation of States parties to “respect and ensure the Covenant rights for all persons in their 
territory and all persons under their control entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or 
otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing 
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that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the 
Covenant, either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any other country to 
which the person may subsequently be removed” (para. 12).  The Committee against Torture 
(CAT) has stated the following concerning article 3 of the Torture Convention:  “Whenever 
substantial grounds exist for believing that an individual would be in danger of being subjected 
to torture upon expulsion to another State, the State party is under an obligation not to return the 
person concerned to that State.  The nature of the activities in which the person concerned 
engaged cannot be a material consideration when making a determination under article 3 of the 
Convention.”77  Several regional human rights bodies78 have expressed similar views concerning 
the prohibition of torture in the context of expulsions in their case law and/or reports.   
L.  Transfer, including “rendition”, of terrorist suspects 
54. States unquestionably have a duty to take effective measures to confront terrorist threats 
and to seek closer cooperation with other States for that purpose.  However, as stressed in 
Security Council resolution 1456 (2003), they must do this in conformity with their international 
legal obligations, including human rights law.  Accordingly, serious concerns have been 
expressed about the transfer, including the so-called “rendition”, of foreigners by certain States 
to other countries without utilizing legally recognized extradition, expulsion or deportation 
procedures.   
55. In most of the transfers reportedly carried out after 11 September, the persons concerned 
were terrorist suspects who, often being held extraterritorially, had not been charged criminally 
and instead were transferred to third States, apparently for the purposes of interrogation.  Many 
of these receiving States are alleged to systematically or routinely practise torture, often as part 
of interrogations.  In certain situations, persons reportedly have been transferred to unknown 
locations and have been detained incommunicado for prolonged or indefinite periods.  These 
practices apparently take place without judicial oversight or any other legal safeguards.  In this 
regard, the Human Rights Committee, in concluding observations on a particular State’s report, 
expressed “... its concern about cases of expulsion of foreigners suspected of terrorism without 
an opportunity for them to legally challenge such measures (CCPR/CO/75/YEM, para. 18)”.  
Transfers which ignore or do not take into account the risk to the physical integrity of the person 
in the receiving State and/or do not afford the person concerned any legal redress are 
incompatible with States’ obligations under human rights law and, thus, should not be 
undertaken. 
M.  Diplomatic assurances 
56. Also troubling is the increased reliance on diplomatic assurances sought by the sending 
State from the receiving State that transferred terrorist suspects will not face torture or other 
ill-treatment following their arrival.  Such transfers are only sometimes accompanied by a 
rudimentary monitoring mechanism, most often in the form of sporadic visits to the person from 
the sending State’s diplomatic representatives.  Some States have argued that by securing such 
assurances they are complying with the principle of non-refoulement, but critics have taken issue 
with this assertion.  Unlike assurances on the use of the death penalty or trial by a military court, 




by competent and independent personnel.  Moreover, the mere fact that such assurances are 
sought is arguably a tacit admission by the sending State that the transferred person is indeed at 
risk of being tortured or ill-treated.   
57. The Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, in his report to the General Assembly, 
mentioned “a number of instances where there were strong indications that diplomatic assurances 
were not respected” and questioned whether States’ resort to assurances is not becoming a 
politically inspired substitute for the principle of non-refoulement (A/59/324, para. 31).  His 
concern is buttressed by the fact that diplomatic assurances are not legally binding and thus have 
no sanctions for their violation.  Even when post-return monitoring accompanies assurances, 
States that reportedly practise torture have generally restricted access to outside persons, 
particularly independent doctors and lawyers who are often best able to determine whether abuse 
has taken place.  Moreover, such monitoring is further frustrated by the fact that persons 
subjected to torture are often reluctant to speak about the abuse out of fear of further torture as 
retribution for complaining. 
58. The Human Rights Committee has expressed concern about the expulsion of 
asylum-seekers suspected of terrorism to their countries of origin on the basis of such assurances.  
In recent concluding observations, it stated:  “when a State party expels a person to another State 
on the basis of assurances as to that person’s treatment by the receiving State, it must institute 
credible mechanisms for ensuring compliance by the receiving State with these assurances from 
the moment of expulsion” (CCPR/C/SWE, para. 12).79  
59. In his report (A/59/324), the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture suggested 
some factors to consider in determining whether a risk of torture or ill-treatment exists.  The 
factors can generally be described as the prevailing political conditions in the receiving State80 
and the personal circumstances of the individual that render him/her particularly vulnerable to 
this risk in the receiving State.81  These factors alone or, in combination, would determine 
whether the principle of non-refoulement precludes reliance on assurances.  However, the 
Special Rapporteur has indicated that, as a baseline, in circumstances where a person would be 
returned to a place where torture is systematic, “the principle of non- refoulement must be 
strictly observed and diplomatic assurances should not be resorted to” (ibid., para. 37). 
60. The Special Rapporteur on the question of torture has also elaborated minimum 
safeguards that should be included in any assurance.  These include provisions granting prompt 
access to a lawyer; recording of interrogations and of the identities of those persons present; 
allowing independent and timely medical examinations; prohibiting incommunicado detention or 
detention in undisclosed locations; and monitoring by independent persons or groups conducting 
prompt, regular visits that include private interviews.  Those conducting such visits should be 
qualified in identifying possible signs of torture or ill-treatment (ibid., paras. 41, 42).  
61. Given the absolute obligation of States not to expose any person to the danger of torture 
by way of extradition, expulsion, deportation, or other transfer, diplomatic assurances should not 
be used to circumvent that non-refoulement obligation.  
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N. Right to property:  compilation of lists and freezing the  
assets of terrorist persons 
62. Following the 11 September attacks, the Security Council,82 regional organizations and 
States have taken measures to identify and freeze assets that may be used to facilitate the 
commission of terrorist acts.  This has been achieved in part through the elaboration of lists 
specifying persons, groups or organizations with suspected links to terrorism.  On 
8 October 2004, the Security Council adopted resolution 1566 (2004) whereby it decided to 
establish a working group to consider practical measures, including the freezing of financial 
assets of “individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist activities, other 
than those designated by the Al-Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions Committee” (para. 9). 
63. The identification and freezing of the assets of persons and groups involved in terrorism 
are appropriate and necessary measures to combat terrorism.  In light of the severe consequences 
that can result from inclusion on such lists, a high degree of care must be exercised to ensure that 
no person or group will be erroneously placed on such lists.  Yet, no relevant Security Council 
resolution establishes precise legal standards governing the inclusion of persons and groups on 
lists or the freezing of assets, much less mandates safeguards or legal remedies to those 
mistakenly or wrongfully included on these lists.   
64. This is problematic since States, having measures containing widely divergent definitions 
of terrorism and terrorist offences, not only draw up such lists and issue the freezing orders, but 
commonly fail to provide for judicial review or right to appeal of initial inclusion decisions.  In 
at least one regional organization, the inclusion on a list as a result of an investigation conducted 
by only one member State requires all other member States to freeze the assets of the listed 
person.  In a country in another region close to 400 individuals and groups reportedly have been 
declared by an executive agency a “specially designated global terrorist”, thereby subjecting 
their assets to seizure or freezing orders.  Lawyers for some of these affected persons have 
charged that such designations are based on vague and sweeping criteria and, once made, are 
open ended in their duration.  In addition, questions have been raised about the reliability and 
accuracy of the information relied on by States in compiling these lists, which is often treated as 
classified material.  The International Bar Association noted in this regard:  “... states that 
introduce these measures often protect the secrecy of the information they posses.  The 
opportunity to challenge the state’s action is therefore restricted as persons affected by freezing 
orders and the like simply have no information as to the basis of the order, and are thus 
disadvantaged in any challenge they may make to the orders affecting them”.83 
65. Such due process concerns underscore the need for such determinations to be subject to 
meaningful judicial scrutiny in order to protect the property rights of those who may have been 
mistakenly placed on such lists.84 
O.  Right to privacy:  information collection and sharing 
66. A related issue concerns regional and national measures introduced 
since 11 September 2001 which entail the collection and sharing of personal data deemed 
relevant to preventing terrorist acts.85  For example, many States have considerably increased 
their surveillance of and information gathering on terrorist suspects and groups through 




collecting “biometric” information and personal data on not just suspected terrorists, but all 
foreign visitors.  Some of this information reportedly will be shared with other States.  Given the 
increasingly sophisticated methods of communication employed by terrorist groups, such 
measures may indeed prove invaluable and necessary to identify, infiltrate and prosecute the 
members of such groups.  At the same time, many of these measures may unduly infringe on 
privacy rights. 
67. The right to privacy and to judicial protection against arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with that right are guaranteed in article 17 of ICCPR and in article 11 and article 8 of the 
American Convention and the European Convention, respectively.  These instruments provide 
for derogation of that right during genuine emergency situations.  In this regard, the European 
Court of Human Rights in the Klass case86 recognized that democratic societies threatened by 
terrorism must be able to effectively counter such a threat and accepted “… that the existence of 
some legislation granting powers of secret surveillance over the mail, post and communications 
is, under exceptional conditions, necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security and/or for the prevention of disorder or crime”.87  It also observed:  “[n]evertheless, the 
Court stresses that this does not mean that the Contracting States enjoy an unlimited discretion to 
subject persons within their jurisdiction to secret surveillance.  The Court, being aware of the 
danger such a law poses of undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of 
defending it, affirms that the Contracting States may not, in the name of the struggle against 
espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate”.88  
68. Concerns have been expressed that the sharing of data between States will introduce the 
risk of data being collected for one purpose while being used for another and also provide highly 
sensitive data to Governments that cannot be expected to protect the data adequately.  In 
addition, some critics charge that such anti-terrorism measures may be abused in an effort to 
improperly influence and shape political agendas, compromise the ability of courts to ensure that 
powers are not abused and weaken governmental accountability by allowing for greater secrecy.  
Some of these measures may also result in unnecessary access to the financial, travel and 
medical records of individuals and an increased possibility that some individuals will be wrongly 
singled out for unnecessary scrutiny. 
69. Recognizing that such measures might unreasonably interfere with privacy, the Council 
of Europe in its Guidelines on human rights and the fight against terrorism indicated that such 
measures, in particular, body searches, house searches, bugging, telephone tapping, surveillance 
of correspondence, and use of undercover agents, must be provided for by law and subject to 
court challenge (guideline VI).  More particularly, guideline V states that the collection and 
processing of personal data by any competent authority in the field of State security may 
interfere with respect for private life only if such collection and processing, in particular:  
“(i) are governed by appropriate provisions of domestic law; (ii) are proportionate to the aim for 
which the collection and the processing were foreseen; and (iii) may be subject to supervision by 
an external independent authority.” 
70. In addition to ensuring review by domestic courts of anti-terrorism measures that intrude 
on privacy-related rights, such measures also require ongoing close scrutiny by 
intergovernmental organizations and competent treaty-based supervisory bodies.  
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P. The principle of non-discrimination and techniques to  
screen terrorist suspects 
71. Numerous States’ law enforcement agencies have employed since 11 September 2001 a 
variety of investigatory techniques to identify terrorist suspects or prevent them from entering 
national territory.  These techniques reportedly include the use of “profiling” based on 
characteristics such as race, national origin and religion.  The targets of such investigations 
frequently are foreign residents, refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants who are Muslims and/or 
of Arab origin.  The resulting effect, whether or not intended, may be to associate such persons 
or groups with terrorism and thereby stigmatize them. 
72. A fundamental precept of human rights law, enshrined in article 2 of ICCPR and 
provisions of other human rights instruments, is the duty of States to respect and ensure to all 
persons subject to their jurisdiction rights without discrimination of any kind.  Comparable 
prohibitions are set forth in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols.  The 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has declared the prohibition of 
racial discrimination a peremptory norm of international law from which no derogation is 
permitted.89  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has affirmed that the right to be 
free from discrimination is “non-derogable under international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law”.90  CERD has also insisted that “States and international 
organizations ensure that measures taken in the struggle against terrorism do not discriminate in 
purpose or effect on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin” and that “the 
principle of non-discrimination must be observed in all areas, in particular in matters concerning 
liberty, security and dignity of the person, equality before tribunals and due process of law, as 
well as international cooperation in judicial and police matters in these fields”.91  In addition, the 
Human Rights Committee in general comment No. 29 stated that:  “no declaration of a state of 
emergency … may be used as justification for a State party to engage itself … in propaganda for 
war, or in advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that would constitute incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence” (para. 13 (e)). 
73. The principle of non-discrimination applies to virtually all aspects of a State’s treatment 
of individuals in connection with its counter-terrorism measures.  Human rights law does not 
prohibit all distinctions in treatment in the enjoyment of rights.  It does require, however, that 
any permissible distinctions have an objective and reasonable justification, that they further a 
legitimate objective and that the means are reasonable and proportionate to the end sought. 
74. Various human rights bodies have paid close attention to the actual or potentially 
discriminatory effects of States’ practices and laws in the struggle against terrorism.  CERD and 
the Human Rights Committee have done this primarily in their review of States parties’ reports.  
CERD in concluding observations has admonished several States that their actions should not be 
based on racial profiling.92  The Inter-American Commission has emphasized that “any use of 
profiling or similar devices by a State must comply strictly with international principles 
governing necessity, proportionality and non-discrimination and must be subject to close judicial 
scrutiny.”93  The International Bar Association’s Terrorism Task Force has also expressed 
concern that the use of race, religion or citizenship as criteria for screening may be both 
discriminatory and ineffective, since terrorists who do not fit these criteria may pass undetected, 
while innocent parties who fit these stereotypes might feel alienated and attacked when their 




75. While race and religion might be relevant factors, they should not be the sole criteria 
relied on by States in screening terrorist suspects.  The International Bar Association correctly 
notes that such factors “... should be used only when applying more detailed criteria, which must 
themselves be reasonable.  In order to assess the reasonableness of the criteria, the severity of the 
measures employed must be taken into account”.95  
76. Given their potentially discriminatory impact, all such measures should be periodically 
reviewed and subject to scrutiny by competent domestic and international bodies. 
IV.  THE ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS 
MACHINERY IN PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS 
WHILE COUNTERING TERRORISM 
77. The Commission on Human Rights in resolution 2004/87 requested the independent 
expert to examine ways and means of strengthening the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.  Such an examination requires a 
candid appraisal of the extent to which existing United Nations human rights treaty monitoring 
bodies and special procedures have been able to address the compatibility of States’ 
counter-terrorism measures with their international human rights obligations.  Particularly 
relevant to this inquiry is whether the monitoring undertaken by these treaty bodies and special 
procedures is truly universal inasmuch as Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) obliged all 
Member States to adopt counter-terrorism measures.  The competence of these treaty bodies and 
special procedures to deal with all human rights which are or may be affected by States’ 
counter-terrorism measures, as well as the timeliness of their monitoring activities, will also be 
considered in this analysis. 
A.  Human rights treaty bodies 
78. The treaty bodies monitor States’ compliance with their human rights obligations in two 
principal ways:  by examining (a) States parties’ periodic reports (administrative control); and 
(b) individual communications lodged against a State (quasi-judicial control).  Notably, only the 
Committee against Torture (CAT) and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) are additionally empowered to conduct inquiries in cases of 
systematic human rights violations.96  As indicated above, since 11 September 2001 treaty 
bodies, most particularly the Human Rights Committee, CAT and CERD, have examined various 
States’ counter-terrorism measures and questioned in their concluding observations97 and views 
on individual communications,98 the compatibility of those measures with the concerned States’ 
treaty-based obligations.  These supervisory organs have also issued important declarations and 
statements on the subject of human rights and terrorism.99 
79. However, as noted in the High Commissioner’s study submitted to the General Assembly 
(A/59/428), there are significant limitations on the ability of these treaty bodies to 
comprehensively address national counter-terrorism measures.  First, these bodies can only 
monitor the practices of States that are parties to the respective human rights treaty.  And second, 
quasi-judicial monitoring is limited to only those States parties that have also accepted the 
relevant complaint procedure.  As at 1 October 2004, 153 States are parties to the ICCPR; 150 to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 138 to the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 169 to the 
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International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 178 to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; 192 to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child; and 26 to the International Convention on the Protection 
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.100  
80. Of the 191 States Members of the United Nations and 3 non-member States, 41 are not 
subject to supervision by the Human Rights Committee and 50 by the CAT since these States are 
not parties to the respective treaties.  Accordingly, the capacity of the treaty bodies to monitor 
States’ implementation of and respect for convention-based rights through examination of 
periodic reports is not universal.  Moreover, the quasi-judicial control exercised by these bodies 
is even less comprehensive.  Two treaties have no complaint procedures,101 and far fewer States 
have acceded to existing complaint procedures than to the treaties themselves.102  
81. Furthermore, control, whether administrative or quasi-judicial, by the treaty bodies is 
limited to the rights contained in each treaty.  Thus, treaty bodies can only monitor practices of 
States regarding certain rights103 or certain categories of persons.104  For example, ICCPR, while 
including a wide range of civil and political rights, does not cover all human rights 
(e.g. economic, social and cultural rights) affected by national anti-terrorism measures.  
Consequently, the Human Rights Committee’s monitoring cannot in this respect be deemed 
comprehensive. 
82. The administrative control exercised by these supervisory bodies is also limited by 
several factors, such as the periodic nature of the reporting system, the backlog and delays in the 
presentation of reports by States and the work calendars of the treaty bodies.  The periodicity of 
State reporting105 and the widespread phenomenon of late reporting seriously undermine the 
possibility for timely and effective monitoring.  The average number of State reports examined 
each year by the treaty bodies is relatively low.  The Human Rights Committee examines an 
average of 15 reports per year, CAT examines 13, CERD, 20, CEDAW, 15 and Committee on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC), 25.  More particularly, between October 2001 and July 2004,  
the Human Rights Committee examined the reports of 33 States parties to the Covenant106  
and expressed concerns about counter-terrorism measures in its concluding observations on  
16 reports.107  The High Commissioner recently reported to the General Assembly that as  
of 27 August 2004, 93 reports were overdue to the Human Rights Committee (55 by at least 
5 years, 23 by 10 years or more (A/58/428, para. 40)).  Forty-nine reports were overdue to 
CERD, and more than 100 to CAT.  Several States have accumulated four or five late reports to 
the same committee, so that 10 years may pass without their being subject to any scrutiny by that 
body.  Recently, some committees have begun to examine States’ practices in the absence of a 
report.108 
83. Quasi-judicial control by these treaty bodies is essentially random because it depends on 
the receipt of individual communications.  Resolution of such communications generally takes at 
least three years, if not more.  Additionally, few petitions since 11 September 2001 apparently 
pertain exclusively to the effects of counter-terrorism measures.  Both administrative control and 
quasi-judicial review by these treaty bodies are thus by nature more reactive than preventive. 
84. For these reasons, the treaty body system does not provide for universal, comprehensive 
and timely monitoring of national counter-terrorism measures and their conformity with 




B.  Special procedures of the Commission on Human Rights 
85. The Commission on Human Rights currently has 27 thematic mandates and 14 country 
mandates.  Like the treaty bodies, these special procedures have considered issues related to the 
protection of human rights while countering terrorism (see A/59/404, paragraph 16) and in the 
last three years have issued important joint declarations on this question.109  And, they too are 
subject to various limitations which impede their effective monitoring of all human rights 
actually or potentially affected by national counter-terrorism measures. 
86. The monitoring exercised by these special procedures, other than country-specific 
mandates, is based on a thematic approach which is limited by the particularized nature of each 
mandate.  And because each mandate is linked to specific rights or practices or a specific group, 
the mandate holder can only evaluate those aspects of national counter-terrorism measures 
relevant to his/her mandate.  Another limitation stems from the fact that many fundamental 
human rights affected by national counter-terrorism measures are not subject to special 
procedures.  This is the case, for instance, of freedom of association, the right to strike, the right 
to asylum, and the right to privacy.  While thematic mandate holders can perhaps exercise a 
more comprehensive control when they carry out missions to countries, such missions are 
typically limited to two or three per year.  Country-specific mandate holders may have more 
leeway in scrutinizing the effects of counter-terrorism measures on the exercise of basic rights; 
however, very few States are subject to this procedure.   
87. The special procedures thus provide a diffuse and non-comprehensive system of 
monitoring of national counter-terrorism measures insofar as those measures affect all persons 
and human rights not addressed by mandate holders.  
C.  Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
88. The Sub-Commission does not have any procedure to monitor the compatibility of 
national counter-terrorism measures with international human rights law.  Moreover, it has no 
authority to adopt resolutions on country situations or to include references to specific States in 
its resolutions.110  It is therefore obvious that the Sub-Commission cannot be deemed to 
constitute an adequate mechanism to supervise national counter-terrorism measures. 
D.  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
89. Commission resolution 2004/87, General Assembly resolution 58/187 and earlier 
resolutions requested the High Commissioner for Human Rights, making use of existing 
mechanisms, to take an active role in examining the issue of protecting human rights while 
countering terrorism, in particular, by examining the question, making general recommendations 
and providing relevant assistance and advice to States, upon their request.  OHCHR has made 
several important contributions on this question since 11 September 2001, including the analysis 
contained in the report of the High Commissioner to the fifty-eighth session of the Commission 
on Human Rights entitled “Human rights:  a uniting framework” (E/CN.4/2002/18); two 
guidance notes submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council;111 
publication of the Digest of Jurisprudence of the United Nations and Regional Organizations on 
the Protection of Human Rights while Countering Terrorism;112 and several important statements 
of the High Commissioner (see paragraph 14 above).  OHCHR has also participated in several 
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conferences on the subject.113  In addition, the Office has begun providing technical assistance to 
States, which included participation at subregional workshops in East Africa114 and 
Central America115 and a mission headed by the Counter-Terrorism Committee to Paraguay in 
November 2004.  OHCHR is now engaged in an ongoing dialogue with the Committee on 
improving cooperation.  It is important that the office’s activities in this area continue and, 
indeed, be strengthened. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
90. As stated earlier, the international community must confront the grave threat posed 
by terrorism comprehensively and decisively.  At the same time, the independent expert 
believes that, while so doing, States can and must undertake effective counter-terrorism 
measures that respect the rule of law and their international legal obligations.  However, as 
suggested in this report, a broad range of human rights have either come under increasing 
pressure or are being violated by States in the context of national and international 
counter-terrorism initiatives.  Accordingly, the independent expert is convinced that this 
subject is not only properly the concern of the international community, but that additional 
measures should be pursued to strengthen the protection of human rights while countering 
terrorism.  
91. It is important to acknowledge that significant steps have been taken by the 
United Nations human rights system to address the protection and promotion of human 
rights in the struggle against terrorism.  Nevertheless, the independent expert considers 
that, given the gaps in coverage of the monitoring systems of the special procedures and 
treaty bodies and the pressing need to strengthen human rights protections while 
countering terrorism, the Commission on Human Rights should consider the creation of a 
special procedure with a multidimensional mandate to monitor States’ counter-terrorism 
measures and their compatibility with international human rights law.  In order to be an 
effective monitoring mechanism, such a special procedure should have the following 
attributes:  its mandate should encompass all internationally recognized human rights and 
extend to all States; it should be authorized to provide technical assistance to Governments 
in the design of counter-terrorism measures; it should be authorized to receive credible 
information from governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental sources and to 
dialogue with Governments; it should report directly to the Commission on Human Rights; 
it should be operational and authorized to undertake several in situ visits per year; it 
should be authorized and encouraged to consult with and exchange information with the 
Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee; it should exchange information and 
engage in cooperative activities with the Office of the High Commissioner, other relevant 
mandate holders and treaty bodies; and it should consult with regional and subregional 
intergovernmental and human rights bodies.  In addition, the mandate holder should have 
demonstrable expertise in human rights law, as well as solid knowledge of international 
humanitarian law, criminal law and refugee law.  
92. It should be understood that this special procedure would not supplant, but 
complement, the work of the other special procedures and treaty bodies, which would 
continue to address questions involving the protection of human rights while countering 
terrorism within the scope of their respective mandates.  As so conceived, this new 
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international human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law, as 
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